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A PROPOSED PRICING PROCEDURE
FOR DOMESTIC AIRLINES
C. K.

WALTER*

In this articleProfessor C. K. Walter develops an alternative procedure for fixing airline fares. The premise of the proposal is that
ticket prices should be dependent upon the distance from point of
origin to point of destination, regardless of the routing or airlines
involved. Professor Walter argues that this proposal is flexible and
programable and that it can provide equitable prices and reasonable
allocation of revenue among the air carriers.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE PASSENGER airline tariff structure has been the subject
of recent criticisms because of the number of incorrect fares,
usually overcharges, encountered by customers Observation and
experience indicate other inequities in the fare structure. The Civil
Aeronautics Board has recently taken steps to remedy some of the
fare problems by ruling certain promotional fares illegal and requesting additional publication of joint fares for trips involving
more than one airline.3 The underlying problems of complexities
in the fare structure still remain.
* B.S.E.E. Case Institute of Technology; M.B.A. & Ph.D. Ohio State University. Professor Walter is Assistant Professor of Marketing, College of Business
Administration at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. This article is based on
a speech given at the Transportation and Logistics Educators Conference held in
San Francisco on September 23, 1973.
'Interline Ticket Scrutiny to Widen, 98 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
April 9, 1973, at 26; How Airlines Overcharge On Connecting Flights, 37 CONSUMER REPORTS, May 1972, at 321-24 [hereinafter cited to as How Airlines Overcharge]; CAB Speaks Softly but Wields No Stick, 37 CONSUMER REPORTS, Nov.
1972, at 692 [hereinafter cited to as CAB Speaks Softly].
2Airline Observer, 98 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, May 14, 1973, at 31
[hereinafter cited to as Airline Observer].
'CAB Seeks Data on Joint Fares, 97 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct.
9, 1972, at 27.
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The purpose of this article is to propose a tariff construction system for domestic airlines that would be equitable to both passengers and airlines, logical in its reasoning, and programable for
computation. The marketing concept is introduced to airline pricing, a significant departure from the contemporary norm. Different
types of trips involving joint fares, a particular point of criticism
in current practice,' are described and the proposed system demonstrated. Arguments for and against the proposed system are discussed. While the article specifically is directed at the airline passenger tariffs, the general concept could be applied in other modes
and with other cargoes.

II.

INDICATIONS OF AIRLINE INDUSTRY PRICING PROBLEMS

A. Promotional Fares
The two main contributing factors to the airline industry's pricing problems are discount or promotional fares and joint fares.
The North American edition of the Official Airline Guide contains three pages of "Family Fares;" two pages of "Special Fares"
for children, clergy, military, parents and spouses of military personnel, senior citizens, youth and others; and two pages with
ninety-nine notes explaining excursion fares.' Fourteen possible air
fares, ranging from $84 to $210, for a non-stop trip between New
York and Los Angeles have been identified.'
Irritation over promotional fares has been voiced by businessmen
who are annoyed at "having to pay the base price while airline
marketing men devise discounts aimed at attracting the pleasure
traveler.""
The fare situation is even more complicated for international
carriers and more confusing for international travelers because
regulating agencies of several countries are involved in rate negotiations. A British publication commented:
The British and American Governments have cheerfully maneu"How Airlines Overcharge, at 321.

1 17 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE 15-21 (N. Am. ed. Feb. 1, 1973).
'Greer, Does Anybody Here Know What An Airline Ticket Costs?, 51
TER HOMES AND GARDENS, Feb. 1973, at 68-69.
' Cutting Executive Travel Costs, BUSINESS

WEEK,

Jan. 15, 1972, at 52.

BET-
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vered themselves into an impasse over North Atlantic air fares, and
this is having a disastrous effect on bookings."
A publication of the Air Transport Association of America
gave less than full support to promotional fares:
Many of these promotions have proved highly attractive to the
public and successful for the airlines ....

However, some of the

promotions, less well designed, have served merely to dilute total
industry revenues.
One estimate of the effect of discount fares was that they were
reducing revenues by about eight percent per year. °
Other industry spokesmen include H. Don Reynolds, former assistant director general of the International Air Transport Asociation, who said:
Fare simplification is an appealing catch phrase ....

But it can-

not be achieved unless all promotional fares are thrown away and
the airlines return to two basic classes of service. If there is going
to be one promotional fare, you will never get two people to agree
what that promotional fare ought to be."
L. B. Maytag, President of National Airlines, called for airlines to
return to a pricing structure "based on the one seat/one passenger/one fare concept.""
Reflecting the changing attitudes of and about the industry, the
Civil Aeronautics Board has declared certain promotional fares to
be illegal, interpreting the Federal Aviation Act as prohibiting the
airlines from "taking social policy into fare-making consideration."" The reasoning behind this decision was that the passengers
who paid the normal fare have to make up the savings obtained
by those traveling on discounted fares. The Board has ruled that
youth and family promotional fares must be phased out, beginning
"The Uncertain Cost of Flying, 246 ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1973, at 66. See also
A Costly Compromise, 101 TIME, April 2, 1973, at 87.
"Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., ECONOMICS OF AIR TRANSPORT: AN OvERvIEW 9
(1972).
"0 Government Acts to End Discounts on Airline Fares, 74 U. S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT,

May 14, 1973, at 90.

" Why

the World's Air Fares are in Such a Mess, BUSINESS WEEK, March 24,
1973, at 62.
" Martin, Moves to Simplify Domestic Fares Gain, 98 Av. WEEK & SPACE

April 2, 1973, at 28.
" See note 2 supra.

TECHNOLOGY,
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June 1, 1973, and cancelled completely one year later."4 As additional evidence of the position taken by the CAB toward promotional fares, a recent airline proposal for another excursion fare
was summarily rejected with the comment that it "may be unjust,
unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, unduly preferential, unduly
prejudicial, or otherwise unlawful."'"
The resultant effect of the reduced number of promotional fares
remains to be seen. It is unlikely that significant passenger volume
will be lost. According to the ATA:
Generally speaking, however, when fares go up airlines don't lose
an appreciable amount of traffic. The reason is that for most people
who travel by air the saving in time outweighs the added transportation expense. "
B. Interline Fares
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., through its publication,
Consumer Reports, has been a leader in criticizing interline pricing
policies: "Probably the highest risk of overcharge awaits the
traveler to smaller cities on routes involving a change of airlines.""
The Consumers Union estimates that five million passengers per
year traveling on 27,000 routes were affected. For trips necessitating a change of planes and airlines, the through fare may have
been previously agreed upon by the connecting airlines and published as a joint fare. When the connecting lines have not published joint fares it becomes necessary for the ticket agent to construct the fare according to CAB procedures. The magazine reported a brief market experiment as evidence of possible widespread overcharging:
Yet when CU recently purchased 31 one-way coach tickets from
10 airlines for a selection of two-airline routes with unpublished
fares, we were overcharged for 20 of those tickets. The overcharges
ranged from $2 to $21 and averaged $12.37-about 20 per cent
more than the average correct fare. Nobody undercharged us. 8
This report prompted the CAB to make its own investigation in
"4Airline Observer, May 7, 1973, at 25.
" American Cut-Rate Fare Barred by CAB; TWA Studies UAL Bid, 98 Av.
April 30, 1973, at 25.
"6See note 9 supra.
" How Airlines Overcharge, at 321.

WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,

Is Id.
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which it found a rate of error of fifteen per cent, considerably
below the sixty-four percent in the above experiment."9 When Consumers Union then audited the CAB's ticket sample and found
additional, unreported errors, it concluded:
The inability of the CAB, of all people, to get its fares straight
underscores once again the need for a simplified, computerized fare
structure that can be understood by the public, the airlines and the
CAB.*
In a later CAB Bureau of Enforcement audit of 612 interline
tickets, 193 incorrect fares were found, an error rate of thirty-one
percent. Overcharges of $1.69 to $51.36 were found in 159 cases,
along with thirty-four undercharges from $1 to $12.58.1 The CAB
has requested that domestic airlines "expand their publication of
joint fares to avoid errors in computation.""
C. Fare Construction
The fare construction rules provide that, even if a joint fare is
not published, a person traveling from origin A to destination B,
with a change of airlines at some intermediate point C will be
charged no more than a traveler going to some further point D.
This rule is important because the individual fares for A to C and
C to B frequently do add to an amount greater than the joint fare
from A to D. Consumer Reports cited a routing from New York
(assume point A) to Dubuque, Iowa (point B), with a change
of airlines at Chicago (point C). Although there was not a published joint fare from New York to Dubuque, there was a published
fare from New York to Cedar Rapids (point D), the next stop on
the route. When the example was published, the sum of the individual point-to-point fares from New York to Chicago plus
Chicago to Dubuque was $84, while the New York to Cedar
Rapids joint fare was published as $73. Therefore, the correct
New York to Dubuque fare would be limited to $73."
11CAB

Speaks Softly, at 692.

20 CAB

Cites Airlines for Overcharging, 38

CONSUMER REPORTS, June

1973,

at 371.
21nterline Ticket Scrutiny to Widen, 98 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,

April 9, 1973, at 26.
" CAB Seeks Data on Joint Fares, 97 Av.
9, 1972, at 27.
2 How Airlines Overcharge, at 321.

WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct.

66
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Although the procedures are not extremely complex, they do
require ticketing personnel to consult several reference publications
of joint fares, point-to-point fares, routes, and codes-all somewhat
tedious and time consuming. It was reported that many agents "had
neither the time nor the training," and would commonly "just add
the various point-to-point published fares.""4 One agent suggested
that "anyone who purchases a ticket that is the least bit complicated runs a big risk of being overcharged."'"
D. Solutions
In relation to potential customers, Consumer Reports concluded
that there was no "sure-fire way of avoiding overcharge."" While
better training of ticket agents would appear to be at least a partial
solution, agents considered that "the great number of fares, rules
and conditions and their frequent changes added up to too much
to master." 7 Surveying the entire passenger fare problem, Consumers Union suggested:
(i) Air fares should be simplified and presented in easily understood terms, for the benefit of ticket agents and consumers alike.
(ii) Information about discount rates should be posted in airports
and airline ticket offices.
(iii) Each airline should prepare and distribute cards listing fares
between any two points it serves.
(iv) For more complicated situations (trips involving more than
one airline, for example), ticket agents should have ready access to
a computer that can determine the fare promptly and correctly."'
A procedure for computing passenger fares meeting the above requirements is developed in the balance of this article.
III. ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THE PROPOSED PRICING PROCEDURE

Premise 1.-A customer wishes to travel from some originating
airport A, to some destination airport B, and is willing to pay what
he considers to be a reasonable amount for this service. In most
instances, his A to B travel is only part of a slightly extended
24

1d. at 322.
2'Discount' Air Fares: A Maze of Overcharges, 37 CONSUMER REPORTS,

Oct. 1972, at 681.
26How Airlines Overcharge, at 324.
21

See note 25 supra.

28

Still Searching for a Correct Air Fare, 38 CONSUMER REPORTS, Feb. 1973,

at 84.
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journey involving other modes of transportation, such as driving
from his home, real origin A' to A, and riding a rapid transit train
from B to a business meeting at real destination B'.
While the customer had no hand in determining the placement
of airports A and B, he did make the decision that these best fit his
particular travel requirements for the intended trip. Commonly, the
number of airports with commercial service near points A' and B'
will be only one each, so for most real origin and destination pairs,
A'-B', the corresponding airport pairs, A-B, have already been
determined by the makeup of the surrounding infrastructure. In
some large population centers, such as New York, Chicago, and
Los Angeles, the number of airport pairs is slightly larger but still
limited by geographical placement and scheduling.
Premise 2.-A reasonable basis for determining fares is the distance from origin airport A to destination airport B. Customers
should accept this as it appears logical to assume that a longer trip
will be priced higher than a shorter trip. Airlines should also accept this premise for the same reason and because it will simplify
the fare construction procedure considerably, while still retaining
enough flexibility for the application of tapered rates, if desired.
Premise 3.-The domestic passenger airline industry acts as a
public utility and is not competitive in terms of price. The CAB
regulates this industry's operations and must approve all price
structures. Between most airport pairs only one airline provides
service during any selected portion of the day, causing the airlines
to more closely resemble regulated monopolies much like other
public utilities. Even when several airlines serve the same route
the situation is one of oligopoly and not one of perfect competition. Airlines do compete, however, in terms of scheduling, cities
served, equipment furnished, ground service and in-flight amenities,
and certain promotional appeals. This competition may be viewed
as analogous to that observed between the various communications
companies (telephone, telegraph, teletype) and between energy
companies (electricity and natural gas).
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF PRICING PROCEDURE
A. Basic Distance Model
A given area may be defined and x and y distance coordinates
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constructed for any desired points within the area. The distance between two points, A and B, may be calculated from:"
d-

=

V (XA -

XB) 2 +

(yA -

yB)'

Because the earth is not a flat surface some modification of this
formula is needed since the linearity assumption will introduce noticeable errors on longer routes. The use of spherical coordinates and
changing the distance formula to calculate arc length would correct
this shortcoming and also would enable the method to be applied
to intercontinental routes.
Thus, the distance, d., between two points on the earth, A and
B, may be calculated from the arc length formula:"° cos d = (sin a
sin b) + (cos a cos b cos P) in which:
d = arc distance between A and B
a = latitude of A
b = latitude of B
P = degrees of longitude between A and B.
Solving for arc length d (in degrees of latitude) and multiplying
by 69 statute miles per degree or 111 kilometers per degree will

give the desired measure,

dA,:

dAB-

d X 69 (in miles)

dA=

d X 111 (in km).

or
Every airport in the United States may then be identified by one
pair of latitude and longitude coordinates. A table of all commercial airports, their latitudes and longitudes," and the above formulas
would constitute sufficient information to determine the distance
between any airport pair.
B. Basic Tarifi Model
The base price, b, of a trip from airport A to airport B will be
proportional to the distance from A to B, according to:
b = dAB X r
where r is some rate per unit of distance (p/mile or p/km). The
" G.

THOMAS, JR., CALCULUS AND ANALYTIC GEOMETRY 7 (1960).
"A. ROBINSON, ELEMENTS OF CARTOGRAPHY 23 (2d ed. 1960).
31 One firm, Centre Mark Company, Elmhurst, Illinois, supplies a data base
file, called CENTRE-US, of specific locations identified by latitude and longitude
(and other codes).
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basic ticket price, p, may be altered by a multiplier designating the
class of service (coach class, first class, or other) c, so that:
p=bXc=dAB XrXc.
If coach class were considered to be the basic price, a reasonable
assumption since most passengers are carried in coach sections, the
class multiplier might be:
c = 1.00 for coach class
c = 1.30 for first class."
If other classes of service are instituted, as has been done in the
past, the multiplier, c, can conveniently reflect these class relationships. Even the so-called promotional fares may be handled by
simply making c some fractional part of 1.00.
The basic tariff model will now be applied to routes of increasing
complexity and extended to cover these cases.
Case 1: Airline provides direct service from A to B. The fare
would be determined by the basic tariff model:
p= dB X r X c.
Case 2: Airline provides service from A to B, but with an intermediate stop at airport C. This case includes a possible plane
change at C, but assumes the trip continues on the same airline at
the same class. The fare for the passenger traveling from A to B
is still:
p= dAB X r Xc.
While the distance traveled by the aircraft was longer, this was
at the convenience of either the airline, the regulatory agency, or
both, and no benefit was received by the customer. In fact, the
customer may be inconvenienced by the extra time expended and
the disruption in the continuity of the trip.
Case 3: One airline provides service from A to C, while a second
airline provides connection from C to B. The price paid by the
customer traveling from A to B will still be:
p=dABXrXc.
'Watkins,
TECHNOLOGY,

CAB Examiner Urges Fares Tied to Cost, 96 Av. WEEK & SPACE
April 17, 1972, at 23.
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As in Case 2, the fare is not based on the sum of the distances dAc
plus dcB because the customer maintained no control over the
schedules of the connecting airlines or the placement of connecting point C. He should not be penalized for a trip involving these
factors. As an extension of the pricing formula, the amounts of
revenue realized by each airline may be allocated. These amounts
will be proportional to the distance between the origin, destination
and interchange point, as follows:

P = dAXrXcXdAc /(dAC + dc)

+

d. X r X c X dc / (dAc + dc.).
Case 4: One of the connecting airlines makes an additional intermediate stop at E before reaching the interchange airport C.
Probably the best way to handle this case is to still consider only

distance

dAc

for the first airline rather than

dA,-+

dEc.

This pro-

cedure will be consistent with the argument that neither the passenger nor the second airline had any control over the intermediate
stop made by the first airline. Also, standard ticketing practice
indicates only changes of flights, identified by airline and flight
number; intermediate stops on the same flight are not considered.
Case 5: The first portion of the trip, A to C, is made at one class
of service and the concluding portion, C to B, is made at another
class. This is currently one area of inequity. Although combination
fares involving changes of planes and changes of airlines are calculated for coach service and for first class service, combinations of
coach and first class on different airlines frequently result in little
or no reduction from the all first class fare. The extension of the
pricing formula in Case 4 alleviates any such problem. Each portion of the formula contains a class multiplier, c. Therefore, on any
portion of the trip ticketed at other than the base coach rate, the
proportionate share, and only that share, will be adjusted.
Case 6: On a connecting flight, one airline is a major trunk line
and the other is, for example, a local service airline. The problem
presented here is one of apportionment of fares between the two
carriers. It has been pointed out that average revenue per mile on
local service routes generally must be higher than for trunk lines
because of the short run, low density, higher cost nature of the
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local carriers."3 Since each portion of the pricing formula also contains a rate multiplier, r, a tapered or sliding rate scale may be
used. One such rate currently used by the CAB for distributing
revenues from joint fares starts at $0.216 per mile on routes up
to fifty miles and declines to $0.045 per mile for distances of 2,500
miles or more." These rates reflect the average per mile revenues
received by the local service and trunk lines of $0.093 and $0.061,
respectively.'
Case 7: More than two airlines are included on an interconnecting ticket. The general pricing formula may now be stated:
n

n
(dA X r, X c, X dX/

p=
i=l

d.)
i~l

where:
i = flight number (for example, 1 from A to E, 2 from
E to F, etc., up to flight n from G to B)
r, = line haul rate for flight i
c, = class of service for flight i
d, = distance, flight i, from passenger's boarding point to
his disembarking point, ignoring intermediate stops
dcL= distance from passenger's origin airport A to his
destination airport B.
C. Example
What happens when the change point C is further from A than
the destination B, i.e. when the passenger in effect retraces part
of his route? For example, consider a trip from Denver to Reno,
a distance of 793 miles. If scheduled direct flights were not available at times convenient for the customer, he might fly directly to
San Francisco, 956 miles west, and there change planes for Reno,
192 miles northeast.' For purposes of illustration assume that the
"Walter, An Analysis of Marketing Problems of Local Service Airlines 58

(unpub. M.B.A. thesis, Ohio State Univ., 1965).
'CAB Plans to Cushion Joint Fare Impact, 96 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, April 17, 1972, at 23.
'Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., AIR TRANSPORT 1973 29-30 (calculations from
booklet, 1973).
'United Air Lines, Air Atlas (Feb. 1972).
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trip was taken during a holiday period and the coach class section
from San Francisco to Reno was completely booked, leaving only
the first class section available for the passenger. The coach fare
between Denver and Reno is $65 while $84 is the charge for first
class." Recalling that the base fare was:
b

d.B X r

solving for r gives:
r b/d"n
r = $65/793
r $0.082/mi.
The ticket price will be computed by:
n
p=

n
(dn X r,X cXd/

i=l

d,)
i=l

p = 793 X 0.082 X 1.00 X 956/(956 + 192) +
793 X 0.082 X 1.30 X 192/(956 + 192)
p = 54.15 + 14.14
p = $68.29.
This fare reasonably charges the passenger for services received by
him. It is not as low as the coach fare because he benefited from
first class services for part of the trip. Likewise, it is not nearly as
high as a first class fare because he rode in a coach section for
eighty-three percent of the distance. Finally, it is not as high as the
fare to San Francisco ($77 coach, from Denver) because that was
not his destination.
V.

CONCLUSION

A. Implementation
Given the computer capabilities of most domestic airlines, the
simple accounting routines developed above should present no
problems whatsoever to program. If no change of plane or service
class were to be encountered on a given trip, the only information
necessary for pricing a ticket would be the origin and destination
airports and the class of accommodations. Keying in the airport
codes would recall from memory the longitude and latitude of each
" United Air Lines, Our Friendly Times, June 1, 1973, at 108.
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and distance dAB would be immediately calculated. If intermediate
stops involving changes are involved, the ticket agent would also key
in the airport codes for them, thus generating distances d,. Since the
rates, r,, were assumed to be dependent upon distance, they would
probably be programed as a function of d, and calculated next. The
output should be the total price to be printed on the customer's
ticket and the individual price breakdowns for the airlines' accounting system to properly credit each flight.

For travel agents without complete computer affiliation, a simple
desk top programable calculator could be utilized; these currently
sell for several hundred dollars. It would be necessary for the agent
to look up the coordinates for the individual airports involved and
enter them on a keyboard, but the agent would not be required to
perform further calculations. Those lacking even these resources
could be requested to call the airlines for ticket quotations.
B. Arguments Against the Proposed Pricing System
Certain airlines may balk at this system because the linear pricing
method does not take into account relationships between the high
fixed costs of operations and relatively lower variable costs. These
result in high break-even points with potentially profitable operations for the long-haul carriers and unprofitable returns for those
lines with a preponderance of short routes. CAB examiner Robert
M. Johnson has been reported as favoring a "dual element" pricing
formula with a fixed terminal charge and a varying line-haul
charge. 8 The pricing system proposed in this article would be
adaptable to a two stage formula by the addition of a constant. It
should be noted, however, that a varying line haul rate with a high
starting point, such as $0.25 per mile for the first one hundred
miles, gives the same effect as adding a terminal charge since most
flights continue on for considerable distances.
The proposed pricing system may invite abuses. For example,
in the trip taken by the Denver to Reno passenger, at one point
in his travels he has arrived in San Francisco and has not paid
as much as the normal Denver to San Francisco passenger. Some
scheming customers may look for more of these double-back routings and schedule them, all the while intending to terminate their
trip at the supposed interchange point, and pocket the savings. One
"B
See note 32 supra at 22.
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solution to this dilemma is to make such activity a federal offense
and hold the passenger liable for the correct fare to whatever point
he chooses. Also, check-in personnel would be instructed to route
baggage to the ticketed destination and not to some intermediate
point. Passengers with hand luggage could still pose a problem. Ticketing procedures commonly ascertain a mailing or billing address,
however, and these could be used if the abuses became troublesome. It is not felt, however, that the number of possible routes
and the number of participating customers would be significant
enough to alter the method of computation. There is one simple
way to alleviate the problem, although it would penalize a large
number of passengers. That would be to price the ticket for the
furthest airport visited, a procedure similar to the current rule for
constructing joint fares. Again, this procedure would overcharge
the majority of legitimate passengers and is not advised.
C. Chances for Adoption
One objective of this proposal was to introduce the marketing
concept into airline pricing policies. The first element of the marketing concept is:
that marketing begins and ends with the needs and wants of customers and society, not with the goals or objectives of the business
organization. 9
Consumers Union has accused the CAB of "warm cooperation
with the airlines and cold neglect of the public." It also challenged
that:
Air travelers will undoubtedly continue to be overcharged until the
CAB stops concerning itself almost exclusively with the profit margins of the airline industry."1
It would appear that the need for the airlines to adopt procedures
developed with the marketing concept in mind has been established. As described earlier, the attitude of the Board also appears
to be changing. Perhaps the time is right for a simplified, flexible,
equitable, computerized fare structure. The pricing method proposed in this article may serve as a base for improving airlines' relationships with the traveling public to the benefit of both parties.
3

T. Beckman, W. Davidson, W. Talarzyk, MARKETING 43 (9th ed. 1973).
"' CAB Speaks Softly, at 692.
41How Airlines Overcharge, at 322.

